Saturday, June 2, 2018
I'm not saying that.
As I was having some sour grapes (that's not to say that all grapes are sour, or that I don't eat other fruit, or that I only eat fruit), sitting on my couch and watching a world-class tennis match on TV (which is not to say that I only sit on my couch---it's perfectly good for laying down on as well; nor is it to say that I only eat fruit whilst sitting---there's nothing wrong with eating fruit whilst standing up, for example; nor am I saying that the only sport I watch is tennis, or that I never watch sports directly and live at their designated venues) the power went out. It probably wasn't a good match anyway.
Wednesday, May 30, 2018
A dream you'd rather not have.
Imagine the following situation. A Dignitas patient-client ingests the lethal dose of the pentobarbital, and soon after falling asleep (the sleep which gradually deepens into a coma, and eventually leads to respiratory arrest and death) they have a lucid dream whereby they're aware of what is happening, but for some reason in that dream they change their mind regarding ending it all. Naturally, they won't be able to wake up, and they know that in the dream.
Monday, May 14, 2018
THE ILLUSION OF DECISION MAKING (an arument for epiphenomenalism)
There's a high correlation between what we like to call our decisions---actions to which we'd like to attribute intention---and their alleged causal consequences. For example I decide to take a sip of coffee, and it happens. I decided to write this essay, and I'm writing it. The correlation value appears to diminish with decisions and plans regarding actions/events that are more distant in the future. In effect, this argument would be to support the ephiphenomenalist view, that the feeling of self agency (illusion of free will) is a real but ineffectual phenomenon.
Now, I'd like to propose an interpretation of what we would normally call decisions, in the absence of free will. That is, I propose an interpretation of what we would call and identify as decisions in the absence of free will----an interpretation which explains the correlation between those intensional events we identify as decisions and the alleged outcomes of those decisions. So to clarify. There persists a strong feeling that we have an autonomous, causal influence over our actions. It seems obvious that we make decisions and then carry them out! Is it possible that we're not actively and freely initiating our actions? I propose an explanation of this strong feeling/conviction of decision-making and its apparent efficacy on the world, even in the absence of free will.
MAIN PART
Here it goes: assuming absence of free will, what we identify as decisions are in fact predictions of what we (our bodies) will do. We're quite good at making those predictions since we know our bodies quite well, and have a well developed intuition that helps in the accuracy of the prediction. This would explain the correlation between the illusory decisions---which are in fact predictions---and their outcomes. It should be stressed that predictions are not intended acts. We don't choose to make those predictions---they just happen and we merely witness them as if they were revealed to us, and we only interpret them as our decisions. To put it another way, we receive the predictions as 'reports' from our system, so we remain decisively passive in this regard. That's about it for the core of the idea.
To be clear the phenomenological aspect of what we would call a decision is still the same. That is, I'm saying that decisions are in fact no more than predictions, and the belief of their causal efficacy is illusory: I'm going to watch this movie still appears in our minds but it's merely a passively received prediction and it has no causal effect on the world, unlike a real decision employed by free will. It's like shifting from a geocentric to a heliocentric explanation of the Sun's path across the sky. It still looks the same (it is the same image on our retinas), but we're not at the center of the Solar system. No longer the protagonists we thought we were.
It should be noted that instances where the predictions fail, correspond exactly to circumstances that would get in the way of acting on a decision, i.e. external circumstances that are unexpected, and as such difficult to account for from the reading of our inner state alone. For example, if I decide to go to the local cinema tomorrow, but it burns down, then I won't go. But this is also something that would be difficult to predict---the likelihood of an accident happening at the cinema is precisely reflected by the degree of my confidence that I will carry out the plan of seeing the movie. Changing one's mind is to be interpreted as merely passively updating/refining/revising a prediction, i.e. being presented with such an update.
It just seems to me that each instance of what we identify as a decision could be equally well explained in terms of a revealed prediction. And it seems that failures to realize previously decided upon acts are equally amenable to being plausibly explained by unforeseen circumstances that are not being accounted for in the prediction.
The picture that emerges here is one where we're mere passive witnesses to our own existence who create (or are presented with) a meaningful narrative which places us at its center as the protagonists, i.e. we live out a geocentric illusion within a heliocentric reality.
Now, I'd like to propose an interpretation of what we would normally call decisions, in the absence of free will. That is, I propose an interpretation of what we would call and identify as decisions in the absence of free will----an interpretation which explains the correlation between those intensional events we identify as decisions and the alleged outcomes of those decisions. So to clarify. There persists a strong feeling that we have an autonomous, causal influence over our actions. It seems obvious that we make decisions and then carry them out! Is it possible that we're not actively and freely initiating our actions? I propose an explanation of this strong feeling/conviction of decision-making and its apparent efficacy on the world, even in the absence of free will.
MAIN PART
Here it goes: assuming absence of free will, what we identify as decisions are in fact predictions of what we (our bodies) will do. We're quite good at making those predictions since we know our bodies quite well, and have a well developed intuition that helps in the accuracy of the prediction. This would explain the correlation between the illusory decisions---which are in fact predictions---and their outcomes. It should be stressed that predictions are not intended acts. We don't choose to make those predictions---they just happen and we merely witness them as if they were revealed to us, and we only interpret them as our decisions. To put it another way, we receive the predictions as 'reports' from our system, so we remain decisively passive in this regard. That's about it for the core of the idea.
To be clear the phenomenological aspect of what we would call a decision is still the same. That is, I'm saying that decisions are in fact no more than predictions, and the belief of their causal efficacy is illusory: I'm going to watch this movie still appears in our minds but it's merely a passively received prediction and it has no causal effect on the world, unlike a real decision employed by free will. It's like shifting from a geocentric to a heliocentric explanation of the Sun's path across the sky. It still looks the same (it is the same image on our retinas), but we're not at the center of the Solar system. No longer the protagonists we thought we were.
It should be noted that instances where the predictions fail, correspond exactly to circumstances that would get in the way of acting on a decision, i.e. external circumstances that are unexpected, and as such difficult to account for from the reading of our inner state alone. For example, if I decide to go to the local cinema tomorrow, but it burns down, then I won't go. But this is also something that would be difficult to predict---the likelihood of an accident happening at the cinema is precisely reflected by the degree of my confidence that I will carry out the plan of seeing the movie. Changing one's mind is to be interpreted as merely passively updating/refining/revising a prediction, i.e. being presented with such an update.
It just seems to me that each instance of what we identify as a decision could be equally well explained in terms of a revealed prediction. And it seems that failures to realize previously decided upon acts are equally amenable to being plausibly explained by unforeseen circumstances that are not being accounted for in the prediction.
The picture that emerges here is one where we're mere passive witnesses to our own existence who create (or are presented with) a meaningful narrative which places us at its center as the protagonists, i.e. we live out a geocentric illusion within a heliocentric reality.
Monday, October 30, 2017
Lucid Sententia XX
A finite length of time, no matter how great, pales in comparison with infinitude. Seconds are in the same class as centuries. In this sense each moment is like an entire lifetime.
Sunday, October 8, 2017
LETHAL SPELL ABILITY thought experiment.
I had thought of this interesting hypothetical scenario recently, which could easily be extended to a thought experiment. Imagine that each person, over the age of, say, 16 was given the magical ability of having another person drop dead by thought alone, e.g. 'Adolf!', and Adolf drops dead. The ability would entail perfect concealment of he act, i.e. it would be impossible to know who had cast the deadly spell. This part is important, so those exercising this magical power would do so with full knowledge of its effectiveness, and impunity. Moreover, I believe that to many, only the presence of such anonymity would be a necessary condition for casting the spell at all.
This is interesting for a number of reasons. I wonder how many people would go ahead and actually use the spell? Also, suppose the version of the magic ability such that the total number of spells was unlimited, with perhaps some daily limit. And that each spell would have to be cast at an individual, e.g. general spells like "may all people above 6 feet drop dead" would be disallowed, which doesn't mean that one couldn't find out who the people like this are and cast the spell on them. At what rate and in what sorts of patterns would people start dropping dead?
I have been thinking about this, and wondering what kind of people would jump at the opportunity of exercising such power.
For example, suppose that in the original scenario (of having a single spell only), we let the time to cast the spell last for a month. The point being that existing grudges, prejudices, and feelings of hate would be sorted out right away, so to speak, instead of having the scenario allow to wait for a time when an otherwise unwilling to use the spell person would be forced to do so in self defense.
So suppose a month goes by and all the spells had been cast. It follows that we're left with a population that is at most smaller than before by the whole number of people (magicians) who were endowed with the ability to cast the spell (the case when no magicians are killed before casting their own spell), and roughly (±1) at least smaller than before by half the number of magicians (the case when half the magicians are killed before casting their spell).
Now imagine 2 alternative outcome-worlds:
--world 1 consisting of all the spell casters and the remaining youth under 16. So this world is left with those that though it to be better to cleanse it one way or another. And those who got eliminated no longer exist.
--world 2 consisting of all the spell victims, and all of the under 16 that were present before any spell was cast, i.e. the original, under 16 population. So basically this world consists of everyone minus the spell-casters.
I wonder how those worlds would evolve in time. World 1 has less people remaining, but let's suppose the populations to be sufficiently large, as not to be in danger of extinction after the cleansing process. I wonder how those worlds would differ, given what kind of people occupy it.
I also wonder if people would just annihilate themselves into extinction, on the version of the scenario where there would be no limit on the number of lethal spells. It would be like giving anyone access today to the current nuclear arsenal deployment.
I'm sure there are other aspects of this thought experiment that I haven't raised, and which could be quite interesting. I'm thinking of writing a short story based on this scenario as the underlying premise. No prizes for guessing that Borges and Lem are among my inspirations!
This is interesting for a number of reasons. I wonder how many people would go ahead and actually use the spell? Also, suppose the version of the magic ability such that the total number of spells was unlimited, with perhaps some daily limit. And that each spell would have to be cast at an individual, e.g. general spells like "may all people above 6 feet drop dead" would be disallowed, which doesn't mean that one couldn't find out who the people like this are and cast the spell on them. At what rate and in what sorts of patterns would people start dropping dead?
I have been thinking about this, and wondering what kind of people would jump at the opportunity of exercising such power.
For example, suppose that in the original scenario (of having a single spell only), we let the time to cast the spell last for a month. The point being that existing grudges, prejudices, and feelings of hate would be sorted out right away, so to speak, instead of having the scenario allow to wait for a time when an otherwise unwilling to use the spell person would be forced to do so in self defense.
So suppose a month goes by and all the spells had been cast. It follows that we're left with a population that is at most smaller than before by the whole number of people (magicians) who were endowed with the ability to cast the spell (the case when no magicians are killed before casting their own spell), and roughly (±1) at least smaller than before by half the number of magicians (the case when half the magicians are killed before casting their spell).
Now imagine 2 alternative outcome-worlds:
--world 1 consisting of all the spell casters and the remaining youth under 16. So this world is left with those that though it to be better to cleanse it one way or another. And those who got eliminated no longer exist.
--world 2 consisting of all the spell victims, and all of the under 16 that were present before any spell was cast, i.e. the original, under 16 population. So basically this world consists of everyone minus the spell-casters.
I wonder how those worlds would evolve in time. World 1 has less people remaining, but let's suppose the populations to be sufficiently large, as not to be in danger of extinction after the cleansing process. I wonder how those worlds would differ, given what kind of people occupy it.
I also wonder if people would just annihilate themselves into extinction, on the version of the scenario where there would be no limit on the number of lethal spells. It would be like giving anyone access today to the current nuclear arsenal deployment.
I'm sure there are other aspects of this thought experiment that I haven't raised, and which could be quite interesting. I'm thinking of writing a short story based on this scenario as the underlying premise. No prizes for guessing that Borges and Lem are among my inspirations!
Thursday, September 14, 2017
I've identified an interesting semi-group in Australian slang ;)
(G, * )
Closure
G = {yeah, nah}
yeah nah = nah
nah yeah = yeah
nah nah = nah
yeah yeah = yeah
Associativity
(yeah nah) yeah = yeah
yeah (nah yeah) = yeah
(yeah yeah) nah = nah
yeah (yeah nah) = nah
(nah yeah) nah = nah
nah (yeah nah) = nah
(nah nah) yeah = yeah
nah (nah yeah) = yeah
The above structure can be extended to a monoid, if we add the empty word as the identity element.
Sunday, June 18, 2017
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)